A convention meeting behind a wall of guards in Kabul is now debating
a new constitution that could give hope to this Muslim country.
December 29, 2004 -- Libya on Sunday let United Nations nuclear officials inspect four sites related to its nuclear weapons program, all
The Unnoticed Alignment: Iran and the United States in Iraq
November 20, 2003 --
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami has quietly announced his recognition of the Iraqi Governing Council and acceptance of
the U.S. timeline on the transfer of power in Iraq. The announcement speaks to a partnership that will direct the future course
of Iraq. The alliance is of direct short-term benefit to both countries: The United States gains a partner to help combat
Sunni insurgents, and Iran will be able to mitigate the long-standing threat on its western border. What is most notable is
that, though there has been no secrecy involved, the partnership has emerged completely below the global media's radar.
President Mohammad Khatami did something very interesting Nov. 17: He announced that Iran recognized the Iraqi Governing Council
in Baghdad. He said specifically, "We recognize the Iraqi Governing Council and we believe it is capable, with the Iraqi people,
of managing the affairs of the country and taking measures leading toward independence." Khatami also commented on the agreement
made by U.S. Administrator Paul Bremer and the IGC to transfer power to an Iraqi government by June: "The consecration of
this accord will help with the reconstruction and security in Iraq,"
This is pretty extraordinary stuff. The IGC is
an invention of the United States. The president of Iran has now recognized the IGC as the legitimate government of Iraq,
and he has also declared Iran's support for the timetable for transferring power to the IGC. In effect, the U.S. and Iranian
positions on Iraq have now converged. The alignment is reminiscent of the Sino-U.S. relationship in the early 1970s: Despite
absolute ideological differences on which neither side is prepared to compromise, common geopolitical interests have forced
both sides to collaborate with one another. As with Sino-U.S. relations, alignment is a better word than alliance. These two
countries are not friends, but history and geography have made them partners.
We would say that this is unexpected,
save that Stratfor expected it. On Sept. 2, 2003, we published a weekly analysis titled An Unlikely Alliance, in which we
argued that a U.S.-Iranian alignment was the only real solution for the United States in Iraq -- and would represent the fulfillment
of an historical dream for Iran. What is interesting from our point of view (having suitably congratulated ourselves) is the
exceptionally quiet response of the global media to what is, after all, a fairly extraordinary evolution of events.
media focus on -- well, media events. When Nixon went to China, the visit was deliberately framed as a massive media event.
Both China and the United States wanted to emphasize the shift in alignment, to both the Soviet Union and their own publics.
In this case, neither the United States nor Iran wants attention focused on this event. For Washington, aligning with a charter
member of the "axis of evil" poses significant political problems; for Tehran, aligning with the "Great Satan" poses similar
problems. Both want alignment, but neither wants to make it formal at this time, and neither wants to draw significant attention
to it. For the media, the lack of a photo op means that nothing has happened. Therefore, except for low-key reporting by some
wire services, Khatami's statement has been generally ignored, which is fine by Washington and Tehran. In fact, on the same
day that Khatami made the statement, the news about Iran focused on the country's nuclear weapons program. We christen thee,
Let's review the bidding here. When the United States invaded Iraq, the expectation was that the
destruction of Iraq's conventional forces and the fall of Baghdad would end resistance. It was expected that there would be
random violence, some resistance and so forth, but there was no expectation that there would be an organized, sustained guerrilla
war, pre-planned by the regime and launched almost immediately after the fall of Baghdad.
The United States felt that
it had a free hand to shape and govern Iraq as it saw fit. The great debate was over whether the Department of State or Defense
would be in charge of Baghdad's water works. Washington was filled with all sorts of plans and planners who were going to
redesign Iraq. The dream did not die
easily or quickly: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was denying the existence of
a guerrilla war in Iraq as late as early July, more than two months after it had begun. Essentially, Washington and reality
diverged in May and June.
Fantasy was followed by a summer of paralysis. The United States
had not prepared for a guerrilla war in Iraq, and it had no plan for fighting such a war. Search-and-destroy operations were
attempted, but these never had a chance of working, since tactical intelligence against the guerrillas was virtually non-existent.
All it did was stir up even more anti-American feeling than was already there. The fact was that the United States was not
going to be in a position to put down a guerrilla war without allies: It had neither the manpower nor the intimate knowledge
of the country and society needed to defeat even a small guerrilla movement that was operating in its own, well-known terrain.
At the same time, for all its problems, the situation in Iraq was not nearly as desperate as it would appear. Most
of the country was not involved in the guerrilla war. It was essentially confined to the Sunni Triangle -- a fraction of Iraq's
territory -- and to the minority Sunni group. The majority of Iraqis, Shiites and Kurds, not only were not involved in the
guerrilla movement but inherently opposed to it. Both communities had suffered greatly under the Baathist government, which
was heavily Sunni. The last thing they wanted to see was a return of Saddam Hussein's rule.
However, being opposed
to the guerrillas did not make the Shiites, in particular, pro-American. They had their own interests: The Shiites in Iraq
wanted to control the post-Hussein government. Another era of Sunni control would have been disastrous for them. For the Shiites
-- virtually regardless of faction -- taking control of Iraq was a priority.
It is not fair to say that Iran simply
controlled the Iraqi Shiites; there are historical tensions between the two groups. It is fair to say, however, that Iranian
intelligence systematically penetrated and organized the Shiites during Hussein's rule and that Iran provided safe haven for
many of Iraq's Shiite leaders. That means, obviously, that Tehran has tremendous and decisive influence in Iraq at this point
- which means that the goals of Iraqi Shiites must coincide with Iranian national interests.
In this case, they do.
Iran has a fundamental interest in a pro-Iranian, or at least genuinely neutral, Iraq. The only way to begin creating that
is with a Shiite-controlled government. With a Shiite-controlled government, the traditional Iraqi threat disappears and Iran's
national security is tremendously enhanced. But the logic goes further: Iraq is the natural balance to Iran -- and if Iraq
is neutralized, Iran becomes the pre-eminent power in the Persian Gulf. Once the United States leaves the region -- and in
due course, the United States will leave -- Iran will be in a position to dominate the region. No other power or combination
of powers could block it without Iraqi support. Iran, therefore, has every reason to want to see an evolution that leads to
a Shiite government in Iraq.
Washington now has an identical interest. The United States does not have the ability
or appetite to suppress the Sunni rising in perpetuity, nor does it have an interest in doing so. The U.S. interest is in
destroying al Qaeda. Washington therefore needs an ally that has an intrinsic interest in fighting the guerrilla war and the
manpower to do it. That means the Iraqi Shiites -- and that means alignment with Iran.
Bremer's assignment is to speed
the transfer of power to the IGC. In a formal sense, this is a genuine task, but in a practical sense, transferring power
to the IGC means transferring it to the Shiites. Not only do they represent a majority within the IGC, but when it comes time
to raise an Iraqi army to fight the guerrillas, that army is going to be predominantly Shiite. That is not only a demographic
reality but a political one as well -- the Shiites will insist on dominating the new army. They are not going to permit a
repeat of the Sunni domination. Therefore, Bremer's mission is to transfer sovereignty to the IGC, which means the transfer
of sovereignty to the Shiites.
From this, the United States ultimately gets a force in Iraq to fight the insurrection,
the Iraqi Shiites get to run Iraq and the Iranians secure their Western frontier. On a broader, strategic scale, the United
States splits the Islamic world -- not down the middle, since Shiites are a minority -- but still splits it. Moreover, under
these circumstances, the Iranians are motivated to fight al Qaeda (a movement they have never really liked anyway) and can
lend their not-insignificant intelligence capabilities to the mix.
The last real outstanding issue is Iran's nuclear
capability. Iran obviously would love to be a nuclear power in addition to being a regional hegemon. That would be sweet.
However, it isn't going to happen, and the Iranians know that. It won't happen because Israel cannot permit it to happen.
Any country's politics are volatile, and Iran in ten years could wind up with a new government and with values that, from
Israel's point of view, are dangerous. Combine that with nuclear weapons, and it could mean the annihilation of Israel. Therefore,
Israel would destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities -- with nuclear strikes if necessary -- before they become operational.
be more precise, Israel would threaten to destroy Iran's capabilities, which would put the United States in a tough position.
An Israeli nuclear strike on Iran would be the last thing Washington needs. Therefore, the United States would be forced to
take out Iran's facilities with American assets in the region -- better a non-nuclear U.S. attack than an Israeli nuclear
attack. Thus, the United States is telling Iran that it does not actually have the nuclear option it thinks it has. The Iranians,
for their part, are telling the United States that they know Washington doesn't want a strike by either Israel or the U.S.
That means that the Iranians are using their nuclear option to extract maximum political concessions from the
United States. It is in Tehran's interest to maximize the credibility of the country's nuclear program without crossing a
line that would force an Israeli response and a pre-emptive move by the United States. The Iranians are doing that extremely
skillfully. The United States, for its part, is managing the situation effectively as well. The nuclear issue is not the pivot.
alignment represents a solution to both U.S. and Iranian needs. However, in the long run, the Iranians are the major winners.
When it is all over, they get to dominate the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. That upsets the regional balance of
power completely and is sending Saudi leaders into a panic. The worst-case scenario for Saudi Arabia is, of course, an Iranian-dominated
region. It is also not a great outcome for the United States, since it has no interest in any one power dominating the region
But the future is the future, and now is now. "Now" means the existence of a guerrilla war that the United
States cannot fight on its own. This alignment solves that dilemma. We should remember that the United States has a history
of improbable alliances that caused problems later. Consider the alliance with the Soviet Union in World War II that laid
the groundwork for the Cold War: It solved one problem, then created another. The United States historically has worked that
Thus, Washington is not going to worry about the long run until later. But in the short run, the U.S.-Iranian
alignment is the most important news since the Sept. 11 attacks. It represents a triumph of geopolitics over principle on
both sides, which is what makes it work: Since both sides are betraying fundamental principles, neither side is about to call
the other on it. They are partners in this from beginning to end.
What is fascinating is that this is unfolding without
any secrecy whatsoever, yet is not being noticed by anyone. Since neither country is particularly proud of the deal, neither
country is advertising it. And since it is not being advertised, the media are taking no notice. Quite impressive. -- by Dr. George Friedman (c) 2003 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
IAEA Report on IranThe International Atomic Energy Agency will consider the status of Iran's nuclear programs at its meeting on November 20. A clean copy of the recent IAEA report on Iran in a reasonably small file size is now
available here: (Source: Secrecy News)
Iran's Nuclear Ambitions
Iran's IAEA Rep Advises Tehran to Sign Up To Inspections Protocol
In June, the IAEA's 35-nation governing board criticized Iran for failing
to report some of its nuclear material and facilities, raising concerns in the international community -- particularly in
the United States -- about its nuclear ambitions. -- CNN, Space Daily
US-EU Statement Says Iran Must Accept Further Inspections
Rice: Europe Should Follow US Lead on Nukes
Bolton: Military Action on Iran an Option
June 26, 2003 -- The
United States and the European Union released a joint nonproliferation statement yesterday that expressed "serious concern"
over Irans nuclear development and pushing Tehran to agree to inspections that are more intrusive.
"We are troubled by the information in the IAEA's (International Atomic Energy Agency's) report detailing Irans failures to meet its safeguards obligations, and we fully support ongoing investigation by
the IAEA to answer the unresolved questions and concerns identified in that report," the joint statement said.
The United States has alleged that Iran is developing nuclear weapons,
a charge that Tehran denies. The statement said Iran must sign the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, granting
intrusive inspections of nuclear activities, without "conditions."
The United States reserves the right to take military action to stop Iran
developing nuclear weapons, a leading member of President Bush's administration told BBC radio in London June 20.
"It has to be an option," John Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and international security, told BBC radio when pressed on the issue. However,
he stressed that it was one among an array of possibilities and relatively low down the agenda.
The United States has steadily ratcheted up the pressure on Iran, which
with Russian help is building a nuclear power station, to abide by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and sign a new protocol that would allow
snap inspections. Washington, which suspects that Tehran is trying to develop a secret nuclear arms program, insists the plant
could be used to produce weapons-grade material.
The international nuclear watchdog, IAEA, criticized Iran's failure to
comply with agreements designed to prevent the use of civilian nuclear resources to make atomic weapons in a statement on
June 19, but its statement fell short of the damning resolution Washington had hoped for.
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice warned the Europeans that only a united front in pressuring rogue states like Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear
ambitions would help to avoid military confrontation.
"We don't ever want to have to deal with the proliferation issue again
the way we dealt with Iraq," Dr. Rice said at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "If you don't want a made in America solution, then let's find out how to resolve the North Korean case and the
She dismissed a vision of multipolarity advanced by French President Jacques Chirac and others, calling it "a theory of rivalry, of competing interests," which "only the enemies of freedom would cheer."
"We have tried this before," she said. "It led to the Great War, which
cascaded into the Good War, which gave way to the Cold War. Today, this theory of rivalry threatens to divert us from meeting
the great tasks before us."
Even before September 11, the Bush administration was often accused abroad
of being unilateral and allergic to multinational treaties, ignoring the views of other countries and bullying them into obliging the superpower.
Miss Rice said the United States should not be feared and opposed just
because of its unparalleled might. She argued that other nations could put their mark on history by joining forces with Washington
to battle terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and other post-Cold War security threats.
"Power in the service of freedom is to be welcomed, and powers
that share a commitment to freedom can and must make common cause against freedom's enemies," she said. Quoting the
administration's National Security Strategy, Mr. Bush's adviser said: "There is little lasting consequence that the
United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of allies and friends."
As an example of an effort that requires extensive international cooperation,
Miss Rice pointed to the recent White House Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims at seizing weapons shipments on the high seas and in the air. The effort, whose targets are North Korea, Iran,
and other hostile states, has been joined by 10 allied nations.
In a challenge to those who think the Bush administration has sacrificed
too many civil liberties in its effort to protect the homeland after September 11, Dr. Rice said: "We have learned
the hard way that our values and our security cannot be separated."
Rice also disclosed that "President Bush has proposed a 50 percent
increase in US development assistance, with new funding going to countries that govern justly, invest in the health and education
of their people, and encourage economic liberty."
-- Edited from the full articles at Reuters, the Washington Times, Global Security Newswire, and Remarks by Dr. Condoleezza Rice to International Institute for
Iran Agrees to Provide Early Design Information of Nuclear Facilities
IAEA Director General el Baradei Meets with President Khatami
February 22, 2003 -- During
his 21-22 February trip to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the IAEA Director General Mohamed el Baradei visited a uranium enrichment
plant under construction at Natanz, including a gas centrifuge pilot plant. During the Director General's visit, the Government
of Iran committed itself to an additional legal obligation requiring the early provision of design information. Dr. el Baradei
called on the Government of Iran to provide the Agency with additional inspection authority for verification of the country's
expanding nuclear program.
Other References for the article at left:
John R. Bolton: Bio
In January 2001, Jesse Helms endorsed Bolton: "John Bolton is the kind of man with whom I would want to stand at Armageddon, if it should
be my lot to be on hand for what is forecast to be the final battle between good and evil in this world."
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
The role of the IAEA is to verify, under a comprehensive safeguards agreement
with a State, that all nuclear activities are not used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Summary of St. Petersburg Summit, May 31-June 1, 2003